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This study investigates the effects of audit partner industry specialization on audit pricing in the UK 
market. The mandatory disclosure of the name of the engagement partner in the auditor reports of UK 
public listed companies took effect from April 2008. Given that the identity of the audit partner is 
now observable to users of financial statements, it can be argued that there may be an incentive for 
partner-level differentiation in auditing products, and hence, audit quality. This research examines 
whether auditor industry expertise in the UK is driven by firm, office, or partner level expertise. The 
fee premium observed in the study is a joint product of firm and partner level of industry expertise 
with the highest premium occurring when the client is also audited by an industry leading partner. 
This finding lends support to the argument that industry expertise is uniquely attributable to the 
individual audit partner’s human capital in terms of their knowledge and experience from leading 
audit engagements in a particular industry. It also provides evidence that some fee premiums earned 
by audit firms and documented in prior literature are most probably the product of the individual audit 
partner’s expertise. 
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Partner industry specialization and audit pricing in the United Kingdom 
1. Introduction 
There is a well-established literature examining whether auditors earn a fee premium by 
specializing in particular industries (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Francis, Reichelt, & Wang, 
2005; Minutti-Meza, 2013). However, most previous research examines specialization by firms at the 
national level or city level. This study investigates the effects of industry specialization by individual 
audit partners in the UK market. 
 Accounting firms are generally organized as partnerships, and this provides them with a 
structure that allows optimal delegation of the decision rights to the partner level where relevant 
specific knowledge is located (Fama & Jensen, 1983).1 Partners play the central role in planning and 
administering the external audit service provided to the client and are accountable for the final audit 
report that they sign (Chin & Chi, 2009). Partner autonomy suggests that audit outcomes vary with 
partners’ characteristics, including their expertise; and that the accounting firms nationally or even the 
individual engagement offices of the accounting firms play a less important role in administering 
audit engagements (Goodwin & Wu, 2014). 
Extant literature in auditing implicitly assumes that industry expertise is homogeneous across 
individual partners within the same audit firm (national level perspective) (Balsam, Krishnan, & 
Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2003) or within the same city for a given firm (office level perspective) 
(Francis et al., 2005; Reichelt & Wang, 2010). This literature assumes that knowledge can be shared 
through practices such as internal benchmarking of best practices, use of standardized industry 
tailored audit programs, and extending the reach of professionals from their primary local-office 
clientele to other clients through travel and internal consultative practices (Ferguson, Francis, & 
Stokes, 2003).  
Nevertheless, it is arguable whether the audit partner’s deep knowledge and expertise can be 
fully transferred between offices or partners (Chin & Chi, 2009). Individual industry expertise 
develops from individual personal beliefs, experiences, and values not easily transferred (Ambrosini 
                                                     
1 Although firms are now permitted to incorporate, they generally continue to structure themselves as if they were 












& Bowman, 2001; Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Nagy, 2014). Besides, not all types of industry knowledge 
can be documented and transferred, and an individual audit partner’s professional judgement is unique 
and is controlled by the innate ability of the individual partner (Vera-Munoz, Ho, & Chow, 2006). In 
addition, there are factors that deter auditors from sharing what they know with others. For example, 
the pursuit of personal benefits and power by individual auditors, constraints and workload pressure 
that reduce knowledge sharing efforts, or inadequacy in audit firms’ information technology may 
deter auditors from sharing their knowledge with others (Vera-Munoz et al., 2006).  
Based on these competing views, we cannot rule out the presence of office or firm level 
industry leadership effects on audit pricing and quality. While it is evident that a partner’s industry 
specialization plays an important role in audit quality in the US (Nagy, 2014), Sweden (Zerni, 2012), 
Australia (Goodwin & Wu, 2014), and Taiwan (Chin & Chi, 2009), the extent to which partner 
industry expertise contributes to higher audit quality still remains an unanswered empirical question 
in the UK audit market. Previous studies in the UK showed that city-industry specialization was 
important, but not national specialization (Basioudis & Francis, 2007), and later that both national and 
industry level specialization was needed in order to earn an audit fee premium (Mohd Kharuddin & 
Basioudis, 2018). Thus, this study examines whether industry expertise at the partner level is 
independently associated with audit pricing. While the issue of partner specialization has been 
studied, using data from the US and Australia (Nagy, 2014; Goodwin & Wu, 2014), the UK has been 
shown to be different from those countries so far as auditor specialization is concerned (Basioudis & 
Francis, 2007). 
 Our findings suggest that the fee premium attached to auditor industry expertise is a joint 
product of firm and partner level of industry expertise, unlike the situation in the US and Australia. 
The fee premium is highest when the client is also audited by the leading industry partner. These 
findings provide evidence that partner industry leadership is an important condition, but not a 
necessary condition for a fee premium in the UK audit market. The findings provide support for the 
argument that industry expertise is uniquely attributable to the individual audit partner’s human 












specialization from the city level (Basioudis & Francis, 2007) to the national level (Mohd Kharuddin 
& Basioudis, 2018).  
The results of this study are of interest in understanding the economic importance of investing 
in partner industry specialization. The results are also relevant in assessing the impact of the 
mandatory disclosure of a partner’s identity in the UK audit market, and in reassessing the impact of 
the mandatory rotation of audit partners and audit firms. Whether auditor specialization fee premiums 
are related to a particular person (partner), or team, or to the audit firm as a whole is a relevant 
question to audit committees, analysts, and regulators, as it reflects on whether audit quality is 
uniform for a firm or office, or varies by partner. Such information could be important in choosing an 
auditor or deciding whether to rely on a set of accounts. Thus, investigating the issue sheds some light 
on this under researched topic.  
In the next section, we provide a review of prior research which leads to the development of 
hypotheses. Then the description of the sample, data, and audit fee model used in the study are 
presented. This is followed by a discussion of the results of the multivariate analyses, as well as 
various sensitivity analyses performed to confirm our initial findings. The final part of the paper 
concludes and discusses the implications of the research. 
 
2. Prior research and hypotheses development 
Auditor industry specialization is a product differentiation strategy adopted by audit firms to 
differentiate themselves from competitors in fulfilling clients’ demands for better financial reporting 
quality (Krishnan, 2003; Dunn & Mayhew, 2004) and to compete on other than cost-price strategy 
alone (Habib, 2011; Gramling & Stone, 2001; Mayhew & Wilkins, 2003). By concentrating resource 
and technology investments in a particular focus industry or a number of industries, audit firms are 
able to gain efficiency through economies of scale (Eichenseher & Danos, 1981; Cairney & Young, 
2006) and build a reputation as an industry expert. It is believed that a reputation as a specialist will 
provide firms with a competitive advantage and greater market power, and the ability to charge an 
audit fee premium (Francis, 1984; Causholli, Martinis, Hay, & Knechel, 2010; Hay & Jeter, 2011).  It 












or by the firm as a whole through the firm’s databases and other resources. Previous papers 
investigating the issue of national versus city level specialization use city level results to examine 
whether specialization is held by the firm as a whole, or whether it resides in individuals (Ferguson et 
al., 2003, p. 433). A widely accepted view is that industry expertise is “neither strictly national nor 
strictly local in character” (Francis et al., 2005, p. 114)..  Those earlier studies use city level as an 
indication of individual expertise; whereas in this study we are able to look more precisely at 
individual expertise as well as at the city and national levels. 
Many studies report a positive relationship between auditor industry (national) specialization 
and audit fees (Ferguson et al., 2003; Mayhew & Wilkins, 2003; Francis et al., 2005; Carson, 2009; 
Cahan, Jeter, & Naiker, 2011; Fung, Gul, & Krishnan, 2012; Mohd Kharuddin & Basioudis, 2018), 
but many others provide somewhat different conclusions. For example, other studies provide weak 
results or insignificant findings (Palmrose, 1986; Pearson & Trompeter, 1994; Ferguson & Stokes, 
2002; Ferguson et al., 2006; Basioudis & Francis, 2007), contrary evidence (Minutti-Meza, 2013), or 
a fee discount for non-specialists (Ettredge & Greenberg, 1990; Hay & Jeter, 2011). The mixed results 
obtained at the national level could be due to the different industry specialization measures used, and 
to the country and the period analyzed (Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson & Stokes, 2002; Huang, Liu, 
Raghunandan, & Rama, 2007; Causholli et al., 2010; Hay & Jeter, 2011). But there are also 
arguments that the methodology used in these studies does not adequately separate auditor expertise 
from client characteristics (Minutti-Meza, 2013). However, although Minuitti-Meza (2013) suggests 
that the auditor’s within-industry market share is not a reliable indicator of audit quality, he also 
concludes that nevertheless, the findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for 
auditors.  
 Other studies on auditor industry specialization examine the effect of the Big 4 industry 
leadership on audit pricing using the national-city framework developed by Ferguson et al. (2003). 
These studies examine whether national (firm level) reputations or city reputations (office level) for 
industry expertise are more valued and more highly priced in the audit market (Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005; Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Hay & Jeter, 2011; Mohd Kharuddin & Basioudis, 












explain the strength of knowledge sharing and transfer of industry expertise between city offices of 
the audit firms. The results of this line of research are also so far inconclusive. The extent to which 
auditing is centralized across audit firms can also change over time, and it was suggested that there is 
a trend towards greater centralization (Bedard, Deis, Curtis, & Jenkins, 2008). 
In the US and Australia, auditors’ industry expertise based on joint national and city 
reputation matters more in the Big 4 audit market, as they are priced at a higher rate as compared to 
national industry leadership alone or city specific industry leadership alone (Ferguson et al., 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005). In contrast, in the UK and New Zealand the industry specialization premium for 
city industry leadership alone appears to be higher than joint national and city specific industry 
leadership (Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Hay & Jeter, 2011). For the UK audit market, a more recent 
study by Mohd Kharuddin and Basioudis (2018) documented significantly higher fee premium for the 
Big 4 firms who are national industry leaders as compared to city specific industry leaders, and that 
the fee premium for industry leadership is only earned by the city specific industry leaders if and 
when they are also the national leaders. This recent evidence shows that neither national nor city level 
industry leadership alone is priced in the UK audit market.   
There are reasons to expect that the UK audit market is different from other settings in which 
the specialization issue is examined, because although the major cities are geographically close, there 
are cultural differences among cities or regions. For example, the two largest cities in the UK, London 
and Birmingham, are one hour and 25 minutes apart by train. Further afield, Edinburgh (the capital of 
Scotland) and Glasgow (the largest city in Scotland) are about an hour distant. Some other major 
cities that are culturally distinct, such as Manchester and Liverpool, are even closer to each other. 
Despite the physical closeness, there are also substantial cultural differences among cities. For 
example, there are many regional dialects and accents, and most people speak some form of regional 
accent or dialect (Hughes, Trudgill, & Watt, 2012, p. 16). These differences in speech reflect regional 
cultural differences, which may explain why city-industry specialization is found to be so important in 
UK studies like Basioudis and Francis (2007). It is also the case that over the long term, the 
differences among cities and regions are tending to weaken. This is likely to be a slow and long-term 












The evidence2 suggests that the market in the UK has moved away from the previously 
documented premium for city specific industry leadership alone, and that the auditor specialization 
premium applies to joint expertise at the national and city specific levels concurrently. Mohd 
Kharuddin and Basioudis (2018) indicates that there was a switch from city specific industry expertise 
to national-specific industry expertise. This trend implies that there has been an improvement in the 
sharing and transferability of industry knowledge and expertise among the city offices of the Big 4 
firms in the UK. This is consistent with the trend toward centralization within audit firms observed by 
Bedard et al. (2008). 
 Researchers have lately started focusing on industry expertise at the audit partner level. This 
is based on the argument that audit partner depth of knowledge, experience, and expertise dealing 
with clients within a specific industry is a unique “private human capital” and cannot be easily 
shared3 with other partners or staff within the same audit firm (Chi & Chin, 2011). Audit quality is not 
only attributed to the brand name of the audit firm, but is also affected by the individual partner’s 
characteristics and reputation (Goodwin & Wu, 2014).   
In their study in Australia for the period 2003-2010, Goodwin and Wu (2014) report evidence 
of a premium only for companies audited by partners who are industry leaders at the city level, 
suggesting that the partner level expertise is the driver of the previous documented audit firm fee 
premiums for industry expertise. On the other hand, Nagy (2014) found evidence using restricted US 
data (based on Andersen clients) in the period 2001-2002 suggesting that there are fee premiums 
attached to both the city-industry leading audit partner and to the audit firm that is a city specific 
industry leader. Zerni (2012) also reported a fee premium for partner industry specialization in 
Sweden during 2003-2007.  
Previous UK studies were not able to examine specialization at the partner level. Partner 
specialization is a crucial component in understanding auditor specialization premiums, and whether 
                                                     
2 Other recent UK studies on related topics report that audit fees and audit quality increased after the PricewaterhouseCoopers 
merger (Ding & Jia, 2012); confirm a Big 4 audit fee premium and higher audit quality (Campa, 2013); and show audit 
committee expertise is associated with higher audit fees (Ghafran & O’Sullivan, 2017). 
3 This is due to the difficulty in documentation or transfer of data/information (e.g. papers, databases), the involvement of 
professional judgment in various considerations, and the gap in knowledge-sharing through the use of IT-based expert 












specialist knowledge is held by the firm as a whole or by individuals. This study investigates more 
recent evidence, including partner-level data, from UK listed companies.  
In 2008, the UK regulator, the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), proposed an audit quality 
framework showing that audit partner skills, knowledge, and expertise are important drivers of audit 
quality (FRC, 2008). However, whether a fee premium for industry expertise is attributable to 
partners within a city office is yet to be investigated in the UK. The disclosure of the name of the 
senior statutory auditor (or engagement partner) signing off the auditor’s report for and on behalf of 
the audit firm is mandatory in the UK since 6 April 2008 (Section 503 of Companies Act 2006). This 
legal requirement made it possible to examine the effect of the individual audit partner. Thus, this 
study represents a response to the call from academics (DeFond & Francis, 2005) and policy makers 
for more scrutiny and understanding of audit quality at the individual audit partner level. Consistent 
with this, the first hypothesis is as follows: 
 
H1: Industry expertise at the partner level is associated with a fee premium in the UK market for 
audit services 
 
Nevertheless, in arguing for a partner element of industry expertise, we cannot rule out the 
presence of an office or firm level industry leadership effects on audit quality. Thus, we specify the 
second hypothesis as follows: 
 
H2: Industry expertise at the firm and office levels is associated with a fee premium in the UK market 
for audit services  
 
3. Research design 
3.1. Data Collection  
The research sample in this study comprises all companies listed on the London Stock 












database4. The sample year starts in 2009 as this is the first year with all listed companies in the LSE 
having to disclose the name of the engagement partner in their annual reports. The sample captures 
the effect of audit partner specialization on audit pricing in the UK (if any) in the first three years of 
the enactment of the new disclosure regulation. We manually collected data on the location of the 
accounting firm’s lead engagement office and the name of the audit partner from the letterhead of the 
audit reports.  
This data is used to analyze the firm’s national industry leadership, the firm’s city specific 
industry leadership, and an audit partner’s industry leadership separately and per year. The firm’s 
national industry leadership is determined based on the accounting firm’s share of aggregate industry 
audit fees. City specific industry leadership is determined based on the accounting firm’s share of 
aggregate industry audit fees for each city. The audit partner’s industry leadership is determined based 
on the individual partner’s share of aggregate industry audit fees for each city. Following Mohd 
Kharuddin and Basioudis (2018), the industry classification used is based on the FAME 
categorization of major industry sectors, where LSE industry codes (SIC codes) are categorized into 
13 major industry sectors5.   
The initial sample comprises 7,222 companies listed on the LSE between 2009 and 2011, 
which was screened to exclude small and dormant companies not followed by FAME, companies 
from the financial services sector, public administration and defense, health and education, and other 
services firms, and companies with incomplete financial data. This results in a sample of 1,335 
observations with complete audit fees data that we used to calculate the various audit firm and partner 
industry market shares. As this study aims to test whether Big 4 industry leaders have a fee premium 
relative to other Big 4 firms who are non-leaders, we exclude 439 non-Big 4 observations from the 
sample, resulting in 896 observations. Similar to prior research (Francis et al., 2005, Basioudis & 
Francis, 2007), a further 216 observations from the sample with less than two city specific 
observations per industry are also excluded. This additional screening is performed to ensure that the 
                                                     
4 FAME is an abbreviation for “Financial Analysis Made Easy,” a comprehensive database for UK companies compiled by 
Bureau Van Dijk. 












audit market in all cities in the sample is competitive where more than one audit client exists. The 
sample screening process for the final sample of 680 observations is summarized in Table 1. 
[INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
Additional analysis of the audit market in the period 2009-2011 reveals that on average 44 
percent of companies in the sample are audited by London offices of the Big 4 firms, and paid an 
annual average 82 percent of all audit fees. The three largest cities after London are Birmingham, 
Manchester, and Leeds. Thirty-three percent of sample companies are headquartered in London, with 
only 53 percent of them audited by London offices, and the remaining by audit offices geographically 
not far outside of London. The remaining 67 percent of sample companies are located in cities outside 
of London and all are audited by non-London offices of the Big 4 audit firms. This analysis of 
concentration shows that the audit market in the UK is dominated by London. This is not surprising 
given its role as the largest commercial center in the UK. 
 Despite the dominance of London as a leading international financial center, there are a large 
number of cities, mostly in close proximity, in the UK. For example, metropolitan Birmingham (the 
second largest city in the UK) is about 120 miles northwest of London, and about 80 miles south of 
Manchester (the third largest city in the UK). Some other major cities, such as Leeds and Liverpool, 
are even closer to each other (70 miles apart), and in between is the city of Manchester. The capital of 
Scotland, Edinburgh, and Glasgow (the largest city in Scotland) are about an hour distant. Moreover, 
the geographical size of the UK relative to countries like the US and Australia is smaller, and given 
the position of London as the primary commercial center, it makes the role of city offices for audit 
firms less crucial in administering audit engagements, and provides the potential ability to audit firms 
to easily transfer knowledge and expertise among their offices (although this effect could be 
countered by the cultural differences discussed earlier).  
In the final sample of 680 companies, 183 clients are audited by industry specialist audit 
partners. The sample includes 86 unique individual partners over the three years of our study. 21 
percent of these partners are located in a London office and 79 percent of them are male. PwC has the 
highest number of partners in the sample (41 percent), followed by KPMG (23 percent), and Deloitte 













3.2. Audit Fee Model 
For comparative purposes, we adopt the same audit fee model used in previous UK studies 
(Mohd Kharuddin & Basioudis, 2018, Basioudis & Francis, 2007). The industry fixed-effects and 
year fixed-effects are included in the audit fee model to control for systematic differences in fees 
across the 13 industries and three years period examined in the sample. The ordinary least squares 















The definition of the model variables is listed in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 HERE] 
Consistent with prior research (Whisenant Sankaraguruswamy & Raghunandan, 2003; 
Francis et al., 2005; Basioudis & Francis, 2007; Choi, Kim, Kim, & Zang, 2010), higher audit fees are 
expected for the following variables: large size clients (LTA), clients with greater audit complexity 
(SQRTSUBS and FOREIGN) and greater audit risk (CATA, DE, and LOSS), London-based companies 
(LONDON), OPINION report, simultaneous provision of allowed non-audit services to clients 
(LNAF), and the (BUSY) season for the auditor. On the other hand, lower audit fees are expected for 
the following variables: higher values of the risk variables QUICK and ROI, and the INITIAL variable 
standing for the lowballing effect if an audit represents the first or second year of engagement. 
Finally, the coefficient of the AUDITOR variable represents the magnitude of the audit fee premium 
under different definitions of industry specialist auditor as explained earlier. 
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Descriptive statistics for the full sample (Panel A) and various different subsamples (Panels 
B-E) are reported in Table 3. Panel A includes the descriptive statistics for the 680 sample companies. 












against the non-specialists, as follows: Panel B splits the companies according to whether they are 
audited by a Big 4 industry specialist partner; Panel C splits UK listed companies audited by a Big 4 
joint national and city-specific industry specialist against companies audited by non-specialist 
auditors; Panel D displays the descriptives for companies audited by a Big 4 city-specific industry 
specialist only (i.e., not national industry) against all others; and, finally Panel E splits the data 
according to whether a company is audited by a national industry specialist only (i.e., not city-
specific).  
There is no prior study in the UK that examines audit partner data, so we cannot compare 
directly our data to prior UK research. However, our descriptives are similar to Mohd Kharuddin and 
Basioudis (2018), who examined the UK audit market (but without audit partner data), with the 
exception of the variables INITIAL and SUBS, which are smaller in the current study.  
The average of some variables, such as the LAF, LTA, and LONDON, is significantly different 
between the two subsamples of specialists against the non-specialists (p < 0.05) in Panels B-E. Others, 
such the DE and OPINION, show less variation and consistently are not significantly different 
between the various subsamples of specialist and non-specialist auditors (p > 0.05). Comparing more 
directly between the different specialist subsamples in Panels B-E, clients of the Big 4 joint national 
and city-specific industry leaders are slightly larger in size (LTA), pay relatively higher audit fees 
(LAF), have more clients located in London (LONDON), possess higher audit complexity 
(FOREIGN), and are more profitable (ROI). Clients of the Big 4 city-specific industry leaders but not 
national industry leaders make more losses (LOSS), have lower audit complexity (SQRTSUBS), and 
pay relatively lower non-audit fees (LNAF) compared to the other Big 4 industry leaders. Whereas 
clients of the Big 4 national industry leaders but not city-specific industry leaders have higher audit 
risk (CATA), higher liquidity risk (QUICK), lower leverage (DE), and higher initial audit 
engagements (INITIAL). The remaining variables (OPINION and BUSY) are comparable across the 
specialty auditor groups.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
Table 4 presents the Pearson correlation matrix for all the variables examined in the study. 












main determinant of audit fees (Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006). Other than the above-mentioned 
variables, there is no other correlation of 0.70 and above identified in the matrix.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
 
4. Results and discussion 
Table 5 presents the results of various OLS regressions.  Except for DE, OPINION, and 
LOSS, all control variables (LNAF, LTA, SQRTSUBS, ROA, FOREIGN, QUICK, CATA, LONDON, 
BUSY, and INITIAL) are significant at conventional levels and in the expected direction across all 
models examined.  
Using the national-city framework of auditor specialization, Model 1 tests the joint effect of 
the firm national and city-specific industry leadership on UK audit fees. We use three auditor 
interactive and indicator variables as described earlier, i.e. Big 4 auditors that are jointly national and 
city-specific industry leaders; Big 4 auditors that are city-specific industry leaders but are not national 
industry leaders; and Big 4 auditors that are national industry leaders but are not city-specific industry 
leaders. The default comparison group is Big 4 auditors that are neither national nor city-specific 
industry leaders. The results of Model 1 in Table 5 show that neither national industry leadership 
alone nor city-specific industry leadership alone results in a fee premium, as coefficients for 
CITYONLY and NATONLY are not significant at conventional levels (p > 0.10). Instead, a fee 
premium for industry leadership is earned only by the city-specific industry leaders if and when they 
are also national industry leaders (JOINT). The coefficient JOINT for the joint national and city-
specific industry leadership is 0.089 (p < 0.01), which represents a fee premium of 9.31 percent.  
This finding of the JOINT auditors earning a fee premium is consistent with a recent UK 
evidence in Mohd Kharuddin and Basioudis (2018), who also reported significant industry specialist 
premiums for the joint leaders (averages at 7.14 percent), without any fee premium reported for either 
the national alone or city-specific alone. Our result further supports the argument that the premium for 
industry leadership in the UK is no longer driven by office level industry expertise. In terms of 
knowledge sharing, this finding suggests that there is some knowledge sharing and transferability of 












national level alone is not a sufficient condition for the Big 4 firm industry specialists to earn a fee 
premium. 
In Model 2 of Table 5, we test the effect of partner industry leadership on audit pricing alone, 
without controlling for the joint effect of the firm’s national and city industry leadership. The model 
uses 183 observations in which the Big 4 partner is the top-ranked industry leader, compared with the 
remaining 497 observations audited by non-specialist partners. The coefficient value for PARTNER is 
0.076 and highly significant (p < 0.01), which equates to an average audit fee premium of 7.9 percent.  
Model 3 combines both the effect of audit partner and audit firm industry leadership at the 
national and city industry level, and tests them simultaneously to determine which type of industry 
leadership is more important (audit firm versus audit partner), and which yields the highest fee 
premium. This model also clarifies whether industry expertise at the partner level is independently 
associated with fee premium, or whether expertise at the firm, office, and partner levels jointly affect 
audit pricing in the UK market.  
With Model 3 (see results in Table 5), we find that the fee premium for firm JOINT leaders is 
reduced slightly from that reported in Model 1 (coefficient for JOINT=0.057 at p < 0.01) after 
controlling for the effect of partner industry expertise. We also find that audit firms that are city-
specific industry leaders alone offer a fee discount (coefficient for CITYONLY= -0.051 at p < 0.10). 
The PARTNER variable in Model 3 is highly significant and shows a similar coefficient to Model 2 
(0.079, p < 0.01). It is important to note here that the magnitude of the fee premium reported for 
partner industry leadership (PARTNER) in Model 3 of 0.079 is larger than that of 0.057 for JOINT, 
both at less than the one percent significant level. This suggests that the industry leadership premium 
is mainly attached to individual partner expertise rather than homogenously distributed among 
partners within a city office. In addition, and consistent with Mohd Kharuddin and Basioudis (2018), 
a fee discount is documented for audit firms that are city-specific industry leaders alone and do not 
possess national expertise. Such result may be an attempt by those city leaders to gain joint leadership 
by offering fee discounts and capturing new clients.  
 In untabulated results, we adopt an approach similar to Goodwin and Wu’s (2014) by 












industry leadership. The fee premium is the highest when both the firm and the partner are the 
industry leaders at both national and city levels. There is also evidence of fee premiums for the firm 
joint national and city industry leadership in the absence of partner industry leadership. A specialist 
partner operating in a specialist office that is not the national leader earns a fee premium, but it is 
smaller than for the specialist partner who operates in an office that is jointly the national and city 
industry leader. These results suggest that partner industry leadership is an important condition for a 
higher fee premium, but not a necessary condition.  
Our results are contrary to those reported in recent studies in Australia and the US. Goodwin 
and Wu (2014) use Australian data to report evidence of premiums only for companies audited by 
partners who are industry leaders at the city level, suggesting that partner level expertise is the driver 
of the audit fee premium for industry expertise in Australia. Their results show no auditor industry 
expertise fee premium at the audit office level after controlling for partner level expertise. This is 
contrary to our findings using UK data, which report a fee premium for partners only if they are 
residing in an audit firm who is also a city-industry leader. 
 Nagy (2014) found evidence using US data to suggest that auditor specialization at both the 
partner and office levels are associated with a fee premium, but there is no significant difference 
between partner and office level specialization effects in regards to fee premiums. The US findings by 
Nagy (2014) are also not consistent with the UK results, as we find no evidence of fee premiums for 
clients of audit firms who are only city-industry leaders when the partner is not a leading industry 
specialist.   




5. Sensitivity to alternative measures of auditor industry leadership 
Many researchers recognize that the results are sensitive to the industry specialization 
measures used (Craswell et al., 1995; Ferguson & Stokes, 2002; Huang et al., 2007; Basioudis & 












Therefore, a range of sensitivity tests are performed using different measures of industry 
specialization in order to validate the results (Audousset-Coulier et al., 2016). 
 
5.1 Ten percent market share cut-off  
Following Mayhew and Wilkins (2003), we redefined the top leaders in each industry using a 
ten percent market share cut-off measure (at the national, city, and partner level), and then rerun the 
regressions presented in Table 5. The ten percent market share cut-off ensures that there is adequate 
market dominance or sufficiently larger market share for the top-ranked industry leader relative to the 
second-ranked industry leader in a particular industry either at the national, city, or partner level. The 
results for Model 1, Model 2, and Model 3 re-estimations using the ten percent market share cut-off 
(untabulated) are comparable to the main findings in Table 5. For Model 3, the fee premium reported 
for the partner industry leadership (PARTNER) of 0.059 (p < 0.05, two-tail) is smaller than that of 
0.074 (p < 0.01, two-tail) for JOINT. Also, a fee discount is reported for CITYONLY (coefficient -
0.058, p < 0.05, two-tail). The stricter definition of ten percent market share difference appears to 
have a small impact on the main results, but ultimately do not change our overall conclusions. The 
findings from the main analysis in Table 5 are robust to this alternative market share cut-off.  
 
5.2 Continuous market share measure 
Next, we test whether the main results presented in Table 5 are robust to the use of continuous 
market share measures of auditor industry leadership. When the audit fee regression is re-estimated 
using the firm national industry leader and city-specific industry leader continuous variables (in 
Model 1), a significant premium is reported only at the national level (coefficient = 0.120) at p < 0.01, 
whereas the coefficient for city-specific industry leader is insignificant at p = 0.10. This shows that 
national level industry leadership of the audit firm is more important than office-level expertise in 
explaining fee premiums. On the other hand, when the audit fee regression is estimated using the audit 
partner variable based on continuous market shares in Model 2, the partner variable is positive and 
significant (coefficient = 0.094, p < 0.05). Finally, in Model 3, when the firm and partner industry 












leader (coefficient = 0.152, significant at p < 0.01) and the partner industry leader (coefficient= 0.114, 
significant at p < 0.05) are significant. Results from Model 3 suggest that both the firm and partner 
reputation matter in influencing the fee premium in the UK audit market, and are consistent with our 
results reported in section 4.  
 
5.3 Alternative industry classification scheme 
 We check in this section whether our results are robust across a different industry 
classification scheme. Following Basioudis and Francis (2007), we reclassified our total sample based 
on the 25 two-digit SIC codes of LSE. We re-ran the tests in Table 5 and obtain qualitatively similar 
results.6 Specifically, untabulated results in Model 3, the model of interest, reveal that the fee 
premium reported for the partner industry leadership (PARTNER) is 0.079 (p < 0.01, two-tail), which 
is larger than the JOINT premium of 0.057 (p < 0.05, two-tail). Also, consistent with the main 
findings, a weak fee discount is reported for CITYONLY (coefficient = -0.056, p < 0.10, one-tail). 
Thus, we conclude that the findings from the main analysis are robust to this alternative industry 
classification scheme.  
 
5.4 Client size effect 
 To examine the Big 4 industry leadership premium based on client size, we follow Francis et 
al. (2005) by splitting our final sample by client size into two equal sub-samples (N=340 each). The 
split is based on the median value of total assets (Great Britain Pound (GBP) £372.123 million). 
 After re-estimating Model 3, we find evidence of a significant fee premium only in the large 
client segment.  Specifically, the fee premium reported for the partner industry leadership 
(PARTNER) of 0.171 (p < 0.01, two-tail) is larger than that of 0.042 (p < 0.10, one-tail) for JOINT. 
Also, consistent with the main findings in Table 5, a fee discount is reported for CITYONLY 
                                                     
6 Under the two-digit SIC Codes industry classification, the number of observations drops by 109 to 571 due to the fact that 
we impose a minimum restriction of two observations per each city-specific industry combination. Based on the 25 two-digit 
SIC industry codes of the LSE, there are more city-industry combinations relative to only the eight major industry 












(coefficient = -0.108, p < 0.05, two-tail). Nevertheless, in the small client segment, no industry 
specialist variables are significant at any conventional level. 
 
5.5 Partner gender and partner tenure 
Motivated by Ittonen and Vahamaa (2012), who found that female audit engagement partners 
charge higher audit fees, we create an interaction term (PARTNERFEM) which combines the effect of 
the partner industry specialist variable (PARTNER) and a female audit partner variable (FEMALE). 
Interestingly, we find (results untabulated) that the PARTNERFEM coefficient is positive (0.145) and 
significant at p < 0.10 (two-tail). This reported fee premium is even higher than  reported in Model 3 
of Table 5, where the PARTNER coefficient is only 0.079 (at p < 0.01, two-tail). This suggests that the 
female gender of an industry specialist partner moderates the relationship between partner industry 
specialist and audit fees. 
 In addition, Gul, Wu, and Yang (2013) and Bedard and Johnstone (2010) argue that partners 
are likely to build up their reputation and expertise with tenure. Thus, we create an interaction term 
(PARTNERTEN) which combines the effect of the partner industry specialist variable (PARTNER) 
and the partner tenure variable (TENURE).7 The results (untabulated) indicate that the PARTNERTEN 
coefficient is not significant at any conventional level (coefficient = 0.020, p > 0.10, two-tail). This is 
probably because the partner tenure period measurement is too short (2009 to 2011) to have any 
impact on the audit price. This initial result from the UK is inconsistent with other studies on audit 
partner tenure in the US (Gul et al., 2013, Bedard & Johnstone, 2010). In comparison to prior studies, 
Goodwin and Wu (2014) found that the fee premium for partner industry specialist is not moderated 
by either the gender or the tenure of the audit partner, as they failed to find any significant result.   
 
5.6 Matching the clients of specialist and non-specialist auditors 
 Minutti-Meza (2013) argues that his reported industry specialization premium using an OLS 
regression disappears after controlling for differences in client characteristics between the two auditor 
                                                     
7 TENURE represents a continuous variable in the regression that takes the value between 1 and 3 years. As the period of 












groups by matching clients of specialist and non-specialist auditors. This led him to conclude that an 
auditor’s within-industry market share is not a reliable indicator of audit quality. Thus, in this part of 
our paper, we refine the main test of the study and examine whether there is a consistent evidence of a 
specialist fee premium when a matched-pair analysis is used.   
In order to re-estimate Model 1 in Table 5 using the matched-pair analysis, we first match the 
209 companies that are audited by the Big 4 joint national and city-specific industry leaders (JOINT) 
with companies that are audited by Big 4 non-joint leaders based on size (net sales and/or total assets), 
major industry, and year, in the order mentioned. When Model 1 is re-estimated using the matched-
pair analysis, the results (untabulated) show that the magnitude of JOINT variable is 0.103 and 
significantly associated (p < 0.01, two-tail) with audit pricing. Next, we perform the same procedure 
to re-estimate Model 2 using the same matching methodology as above, and match the 183 companies 
audited by partner industry leaders (PARTNER) with companies audited by non-leaders again based 
on size (net sales and/or total assets), major industry, and year, in the order mentioned. When Model 2 
is re-estimated using the above matched-pair analysis, the results (untabulated) present a significant 
and positive relationship (coefficient = 0.088, p < 0.01, two-tail) between PARTNER and audit 
pricing. 
Taken together, using the approach described by Minutti-Meza (2013), the reported 
(untabulated) results for both Model 1 and Model 2 under the matched-sample analyses are consistent 
with the main findings reported in Table 5 using OLS regression. These findings reaffirm our 
evidence of fee premium for the JOINT and PARTNER variables. However, in contrast to Minutti-
Meza (2013), these two methodological approaches produce similar results, and therefore, yield the 
same conclusion in our study.  
 
5.7 Market share based on clients’ total assets and total sales 
We test whether the main findings are sensitive to the use of audit fees to measure auditor 
market shares and industry leadership. The market shares of audit firms are recalculated based on the 
clients’ total assets and on clients’ total sales. Similar to the prior UK study by Mohd Kharuddin and 












city-specific industry leaders, and fee discounts are reported for the city-specific industry leaders 
alone (p < 0.01). The fee premiums for the joint leaders based on the clients’ total assets and on 
clients’ total sales are lower than the fee premium for JOINT reported in Model 1 of Table 5, possibly 
because the discount offered by the city-specific industry leaders alone offsets the higher fee premium 
charged by the joint leaders.  
When we re-estimate Model 2 using clients assets and client sales in separate models to 
measure partner industry leadership, we find no significant fee premium attached to partner industry 
specialization (at p > 0.10). When we re-estimate Model 3, the results from using clients’ assets and 
clients’ sales contradict each other. Model 2 and Model 3 examine partner specialization, and it is 
evidenced that partner specialization may not be captured well by measures of client total assets or 
client sales. This is consistent with earlier UK studies by Basioudis and Francis (2007) and Mohd 
Kharuddin and Basioudis (2018), where similar incongruous results between specialization based on 
audit fees versus specialization based on client total assets and client sales were recorded.  
We infer that the results in Table 5 that use audit fees to measure industry leadership are not 
robust to alternative definitions of industry market share leadership based on either assets of clients or 
the sales of clients. An explanation for the lack of significance here is that the measures of 
specialization using assets or sales are not reliable measures of auditor specialization. Audousset-
Coulier et al. (2016, p. 158) conclude that such size-based measures “failed to act as valid surrogates” 
for specialization. 
 
6. Conclusion and Limitation 
This study is motivated by the issue of differentiating auditor quality and the opportunity 
provided by the mandatory requirement for the disclosure of the engagement partner’s name in the 
auditor’s report in the UK. This requirement provides an opportunity to investigate whether audit 
industry expertise is driven by firm, office, or partner level expertise, or some combination of them. 
 The results suggest that the fee premium attached to auditor industry expertise is a joint 
product of industry expertise at both the firm (national) and partner levels. The fee premium is highest 












leadership is an important condition, but not a necessary condition for a fee premium. This partly 
supports the argument that industry expertise is uniquely attributable to the individual audit partner 
human capital in terms of their knowledge and experience from leading audit engagements in a 
particular industry. Expertise also captured at the firm national level remains an important aspect in 
generating fee premiums8. Our findings are generally robust to alternative measures of industry 
leadership as presented in the additional analysis section. 
 This study uses data from 2009 to 2011 as this was the immediate period after which audit 
partner names were first disclosed in the UK. We are capturing the immediate and direct 
specialization effects of the newly available partner data available after this new regulation, and as 
such, the first three years of disclosure provide sufficient information for adequate conclusions to be 
reached. Nevertheless, we acknowledge that this time period can be regarded as a limitation of the 
study, and we encourage other researchers to extend the study using more recent data. 
 This study informs practitioners whether it is economically important for the individual 
auditor to invest in industry specialization and build a reputation as an industry expert. It is also 
applicable to whether the audit firm would need to develop a more effective mechanism to facilitate 
knowledge transfer between all its partners so that the audit firm could create a broader reputation for 
industry expertise. Our results are also of interest to international regulators and standard setters in 
gaining better understanding of the drivers of audit quality and to what extent the firm, office, and/or 
partner level industry expertise may affect audit quality. It is relevant to the implications of the 
disclosure of the identity of engagement partners in the auditor’s report. 
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Selection Procedures for the Final Sample 
All LSE listed companies in 2009-2011  7,222   
Less: Companies not followed by FAME database (mainly, small and dormant) (4,065) 
Less: Financial firms, public administration and defence,       
         health and education, other services firms    (1,651) 
Less: Firms with incomplete data (171) 
Full sample with complete data     1,335 
Less: Non-Big 4 sample (439) 
Full Big 4 sample 896 
Less: Sample with less than two observations per city-industry combination (216) 















Definition of Variables 
Variable  Definition 
DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
LAF natural log of audit fees in GBP’000 
  
SPECIFICATION FOR INDUSTRY SPECIALIST AUDITOR (AUDITOR) VARIABLES 
JOINT  indicator variable, = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally and the audit office is the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share, 0 if otherwise 
CITY_ONLY indicator variable, = 1 if the audit firm is not the top-ranked by market share 
nationally and the audit office is the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share, 0 if otherwise   
NAT_ONLY indicator variable, = 1 if the audit firm is the top-ranked by market share 
nationally and the audit office is not the top-ranked by city-industry market 
share, 0 if otherwise 
PARTNER indicator variable, = 1 if the audit partner is the top-ranked by city-industry 
market share, 0 if otherwise 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
LNAF natural log of non-audit fees (in GBP’000) paid to the incumbent auditor 
LTA natural log of total assets in GBP’000 
SQRTSUBS square root of total subsidiaries 
ROI ratio of earnings before interest and tax to total assets 
DE ratio of long-term debt to total assets 
FOREIGN proportion of total sales from foreign operations 
QUICK ratio of current assets (less inventories) to current liabilities 
CATA ratio of current assets to total assets 
OPINION indicator variable, 1 = qualified or going concern audit report; 0 = otherwise 
LONDON indicator variable, 1 = London-based company, 0 = otherwise 
BUSY indicator variable, 1 = December 31st or March 31st year-end, 0 = otherwise 
LOSS indicator variable, 1 = loss in any of the past three years, 0 = otherwise 
INITIAL indicator variable, 1 = new auditor in the current or prior year, 0 = otherwise 














Descriptive Statistics  
Panel A: Full Sample (N = 680) 
 Mean  Median  Std. 
Dev. 
 Q1  Q3 
LAF 5.510   5.435   0.615   5.050   5.900  
LNAF 4.928   5.205   1.477   4.720   5.713  
LTA 8.629   8.570   0.917   7.960   9.313  
SQRTSUBS 3.459   3.160   1.755   2.240   4.690  
CATA 0.430   0.410   0.232   0.250   0.583  
QUICK 1.802   0.950   3.539   0.630   1.470  
DE 0.143   0.100   0.153   0.000   0.240  
ROI 0.023   0.050   0.185   0.000   0.100  
FOREIGN 0.361   0.120   0.406   0.000   0.840  
OPINION 0.051   0.000   0.221   0.000   0.000  
BUSY 0.651   1.000   0.477   0.000   1.000  
LOSS 0.212   0.000   0.409   0.000   0.000  
LONDON 0.403   0.000   0.491   0.000   1.000  
INITIAL 0.131   0.000   0.338   0.000   0.000  
   















TABLE 3 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics  
Panel B: Big 4 Partner Industry Leader Sample (N = 183) Big 4 Non-Leader Sample (N = 497) Mean Difference 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  T-test  p-value  
LAF 5.625  0.712  5.468  0.570  -2.981  0.003  
LNAF 5.052  1.465  4.883  1.480  -1.3241  0.186  
LTA 8.757  1.018  8.582  0.873  -2.214  0.027  
SQRTSUBS 3.629  1.875  3.397  1.707  -1.5309  0.126  
CATA 0.435  0.212  0.428  0.240  -0.357  0.721  
QUICK 1.372  1.891  1.961  3.967  1.930  0.054  
DE 0.155  0.156  0.138  0.151  -1.281  0.201  
ROI 0.033  0.151  0.019  0.197  -0.877  0.381  
FOREIGN 0.348  0.397  0.366  0.410  0.561  0.613  
OPINION 0.055  0.228  0.050  0.219  -0.227  0.821  
BUSY 0.705  0.457  0.632  0.483  -1.776  0.076  
LOSS 0.186  0.390  0.221  0.416  1.005  0.315  
LONDON 0.257  0.438  0.457  0.499  4.786  0.000  
INITIAL 0.098  0.299  0.143  0.350  1.526  0.127  
Panel C: 
Big4 Joint National and City-Specific Industry 
Leader Sample (N = 209) Big4 Non-Leader Sample (N = 471) 
Mean Difference 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  T-test  p-value  
LAF 5.745  0.689  5.406  0.549  -6.848  0.000  
LNAF 5.104  1.636  4.850  1.395  -2.070  0.039  
LTA 8.948  0.941  8.488  0.870  -6.205  0.000  
SQRTSUBS 3.675  1.807  3.364  1.726  -2.143  0.033  
CATA 0.396  0.208  0.445  0.241  2.524  0.012  
QUICK 1.504  3.170  1.935  3.686  1.465  0.143  
DE 0.151  0.140  0.139  0.158  -0.931  0.352  
ROI 0.055  0.125  0.009  0.205  -2.967  0.003  
FOREIGN 0.385  0.417  0.350  0.401  -1.047  0.296  
OPINION 0.053  0.224  0.051  0.220  -0.091  0.927  
BUSY 0.679  0.468  0.639  0.481  -1.018  0.309  
LOSS 0.172  0.379  0.229  0.421  1.681  0.093  
LONDON 0.402  0.491  0.403  0.491  0.036  0.971  
INITIAL 0.077  0.267  0.155  0.362  2.810  0.005  














TABLE 3  (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics 
Panel D: Big4 City-Specific Industry Leader Only Sample (N = 104)  Big4 Non-Leader Sample  (N = 576) Mean Difference 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  T-test  p-value  
LAF 5.252  0.506  5.557  0.622  4.720  0.000  
LNAF 4.561  1.515  4.995  1.461  2.771  0.006  
LTA 8.275  0.903  8.693  0.905  4.343  0.000  
SQRTSUBS 3.161  1.743  3.513  1.754  1.885  0.060  
CATA 0.469  0.236  0.422  0.231  -1.901  0.058  
QUICK 1.557  2.375  1.847  3.710  1.885  0.060  
DE 0.156  0.172  0.140  0.149  -0.933  0.351  
ROI -0.040  0.252  0.034  0.168  3.782  0.000  
FOREIGN 0.249  0.332  0.381  0.415  3.070  0.002  
OPINION 0.067  0.252  0.049  0.215  -0.793  0.428  
BUSY 0.692  0.464  0.644  0.479  -0.945  0.343  
LOSS 0.240  0.429  0.207  0.405  -0.775  0.438  
LONDON 0.221  0.417  0.436  0.496  4.153  0.000  
INITIAL 0.144  0.353  0.128  0.335  -0.439  0.662  
Panel E: Big4 National Industry Leader Only Sample (N = 36) Big4 Non-Leader Sample (N = 664) Mean Difference 
 Mean  Std. Dev.  Mean  Std. Dev.  T-test  p-value  
LAF 5.124  0.439  5.532  0.617  3.913  0.000  
LNAF 4.604  1.547  4.946  1.472  1.355  0.176  
LTA 8.003  0.690  8.664  0.916  4.268  0.000  
SQRTSUBS 3.329  1.530  3.467  1.768  0.457  0.648  
CATA 0.487  0.251  0.426  0.231  -1.515  0.130  
QUICK 1.663  3.598  1.810  3.538  0.243  0.809  
DE 0.119  0.158  0.144  0.152  0.937  0.336  
ROI 0.003  0.210  0.024  0.184  0.674  0.501  
FOREIGN 0.239  0.356  0.368  0.408  1.861  0.063  
OPINION 0.056  0.232  0.051  0.221  -0.114  0.910  
BUSY 0.583  0.500  0.655  0.476  0.881  0.379  
LOSS 0.250  0.439  0.210  0.407  -0.576  0.565  







 -0.653  0.514  















Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  A B C D E F G H I J K L 
A LAF 1            
B LNAF 0.5444* 1           
C LTA 0.9034* 0.5049* 1          
D SQRTSUBS 0.6213* 0.3299* 0.5429* 1         
E ROI 0.3368* 0.2191* 0.4284* 0.2397* 1        
F DE 0.3704* 0.1819* 0.4332* 0.1936* 0.1279* 1       
G FOREIGN 0.1853* 0.1191* 0.0938* 0.1245* 0.0605* 0.0258 1      
H QUICK -0.2940* -0.1899* -0.2459* -0.2132* -0.1930* -0.2355* -0.0872* 1     
I CATA -0.1747* 0.0003 -0.2544* -0.0405* -0.0621* -0.3733* -0.0679* 0.2129* 1    
J OPINION -0.1862* -0.1774* -0.2376* -0.1478* -0.2989* -0.0888* -0.0133 0.0286 -0.1102* 1   
K LONDON 0.0171 -0.0434* -0.0305 -0.0704* -0.0990* -0.0632* 0.1371* 0.1209* -0.1325* 0.0866* 1  
L BUSY 0.1202* 0.0869* 0.0710* 0.0625* -0.0368 -0.0652* 0.1164* 0.0583* -0.0388 0.0431* 0.1564* 1 
M LOSS -0.3241* -0.2087* -0.3782* -0.2313* -0.4853* -0.1421* 0.0133 0.2567* 0.0049 0.2295* 0.1560* 0.0464* 
N INITIAL -0.1975* -0.1920* -0.1741* -0.1057* -0.0796* -0.0553* -0.0668* 0.0558* -0.0351 0.0530* -0.0433* -0.0347 
O JOINT  0.3908* 0.1997* 0.3849* 0.1947* 0.1613* 0.1628* 0.0166 -0.1062* -0.0888* -0.0541* -0.0776* 0.0285 
P CITYONLY  0.0416 0.0714* 0.0523* 0.0696* -0.0029 0.0936* -0.0356 -0.0669* 0.0466* -0.0342 -0.1606* 0.0213 
Q NATONLY  -0.0185 0.0353 -0.0183 0.0474* 0.0264 0.0037 -0.0586* -0.0328 0.0311 -0.0066 -0.0940* -0.0269 
R PARTNER  0.2900* 0.1884* 0.2716* 0.1804* 0.1182* 0.1449* 0.0146 -0.1148* -0.0059 -0.0508* -0.2036* 0.0515* 
              














TABLE 4 (Continued) 
Correlation Matrix  
  M N O P Q R        
M LOSS 1             
N INITIAL 0.0820* 1            
O JOINT  -0.1438* -0.1165* 1           
P CITYONLY  -0.0352 -0.0383 -0.1603* 1          
Q NATONLY  -0.0182 0.0084 -0.0901* -0.0595* 1         
R PARTNER  -0.1130* -0.0686* 0.3723* 0.5104* -0.0865* 1        
               













Regression Results for the Audit Fee Models 




Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value Coef. t-stat p-value 
Constant                                    
+/-                +/- 
0.637 5.420 0.000 0.603 5.330 0.000 0.675 5.910 0.000 
          
JOINT (N=209) + 0.089 4.530 0.000    0.057 2.830 0.005 
CITYONLY (N=104) + 0.006 0.220 0.827    -0.051 -1.770 0.078 
NATONLY (N=36) + 0.013 0.310 0.755    0.013 0.320 0.746 
PARTNER (N=183) +    0.076 3.660 0.000 0.079 3.470 0.001 
           
Control variables           
LNAF + 0.042 5.010 0.000 0.041 4.850 0.000 0.041 4.910 0.000 
LTA + 0.494 31.890 0.000 0.500 33.390 0.000 0.490 32.760 0.000 
SQRTSUBS + 0.067 10.400 0.000 0.067 10.650 0.000 0.067 10.590 0.000 
ROI - -0.135 -2.550 0.011 -0.127 -2.340 0.020 -0.142 -2.690 0.007 
DE + -0.119 -1.630 0.103 -0.155 -2.160 0.031 -0.121 -1.680 0.093 
FOREIGN + 0.167 6.470 0.000 0.169 6.460 0.000 0.166 6.410 0.000 
QUICK - -0.009 -3.270 0.001 -0.009 -2.970 0.003 -0.009 -3.190 0.001 
CATA + 0.109 2.080 0.038 0.092 1.780 0.075 0.100 1.950 0.051 
OPINION + 0.064 1.210 0.226 0.070 1.360 0.173 0.063 1.190 0.233 
LONDON + 0.090 4.840 0.000 0.101 5.370 0.000 0.098 5.280 0.000 
BUSY + 0.062 3.350 0.001 0.060 3.260 0.001 0.060 3.310 0.001 
LOSS + 0.026 0.930 0.354 0.031 1.110 0.268 0.024 0.860 0.392 
INITIAL - -0.104 -3.770 0.000 -0.108 -3.930 0.000 -0.104 -3.750 0.000 
    








    Yes 








    Yes 
R2   0.880 0.879 0.882 
N  680 680 680 
a All p-values are two-tailed. Industry fixed-effects and year fixed-effects are not reported for brevity, and t-statistics and significance 
levels are calculated using the White (1980) robust standard errors to correct for heteroscedasticity. 
b The sample comprises 680 observations of UK public listed companies that are audited by Big 4 auditors. The sample size is derived 
after deleting 216 observations with less than two city-specific observations per industry from the Big 4 sample (N = 896 as reported 
in Table 1). This additional screening is performed as to ensure that the audit market for the all the cities in specific industries analyzed 
is competitive where more than one audit client exists. 
The dependent variable is LAF, the natural log of audit fees in GBP’000.  
 
Refer to Table 2 for definition of variables. 
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